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We contribute to the field of urban governance and globalization through an empirically-based 
exploration of determinants of performance of cities.  We construct a preliminary worldwide 
database for cities, containing variables and indicators of globalization (at the country and city 
level), city governance, city performance (access and quality of infrastructure service delivery), as 
well as other relevant city characteristics.  This city database, encompassing hundreds of cities 
worldwide, integrates existing data with new data gathered for this research project.  We present a 
very simple conceptual framework and a set of hypotheses, and then test them econometrically.  
The findings suggest that good governance and globalization (at both the country as well as at the 
city level) do matter for city-level performance in terms of access and quality of delivery of 
infrastructure services.  We also find that globalization and good city governance are significantly 
related with each other.  There appear to be dynamic pressures from globalization and 
accountability that result in better performance at the city level.  Furthermore, the evidence suggests 
that there are particular and complex interactions between technology choices, governance and city 
performance, as well as evidence of a non-linear (u-shaped) relationship between city size and 
performance, challenging the view that very large cities necessarily exhibit lower performance and 
pointing to potential agglomeration economies.  Our framework also suggests a way of bridging 
two seemingly competing strands of the literature, namely viewing the city as a place or as an 
outcome.  We conclude pointing to the need for expanding the database and the econometric 
framework, as well as to more general future research directions and policy implications emerging 
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1  Introduction:  The empirical challenge 
 
Does globalization at the city and country level matter for sound urban governance?  Do 
sound urban governance and globalization affect city performance?  
 
While studies on the first question are particularly scarce, some insights into the second 
question can be found in the existing literature.  In particular, there has been an explosion 
in the literature on globalization and urban management.  A simple search on the internet 
reveals thousands of citations and references on the topic.  These range from theoretical 
explorations such as the work of the “Globalization and World Cities Group” based in 
Loughborough University, England (GaWC) but also include newsworthy pieces that refer 
to specific decisions made by cities to position themselves in a global world.  The work of 
Saskia Sassen dominates the citations on the subject of globalization and cities, and a 
number of sites dedicate themselves to organizing the literature and the data on 
globalization with some reference to cities, such as the work of the “Transnationalism 
Project” of the University of Chicago.  The most used terminology to refer to globalization 
of cities is the term “networked”, followed by the word “flows”, both of which appear in 
the vast majority of the internet searches.  However, the reference to globalization in the 




The virtual absence of data and empirically based treatment of the subject is particularly 
striking.  A search of the empirical literature on globalization and urban governance 
suggests a significant gap, largely due to limited comparable cross-city data.  This is 
particularly the case on governance and globalization issues, where an internet-based 
search elicits very few empirically-based entries.  Researchers have in fact lamented the 
difficulty of getting reliable comparative data to analyze the issues related to globalization 
of cities (see Short et al (1996) and Knox P.L. (2002)). 
 
But does the data at our disposal permit even an initial exploration into those issues at the 
city level? If so, is there significant variation in city-level performance, governance and 
globalization—even within countries?  Are differences across cities significant enough to 
warrant this line of empirical inquiry? And even if they are, do these differences matter?  
Within this initial empirical exploration, we try to address these issues.  We find that the 
cross-city variance worldwide is rather substantial; and in fact even within countries such 
intra-city variance is not small—in general the extent of within-country cross-city variance 
is above one-half the cross-country variation.  Such apparent rich diversity of experiences 
and performance across cities is worth reviewing, and thus exploring the potential 
determinants of the variation in performance is warranted. 
 
Consequently, in this paper we try to contribute to the field of urban governance and 
globalization through an empirically-based exploration of some key determinants of the 
performance of cities.  This empirical inquiry is made possible through the construction of 
a worldwide database for cities that contains variables and indicators of globalization (at 
                                                 
2 Due to the dynamic nature of data entry into the internet, these search percentages are valid at the time of 
the search, which was April, 2004.   3
the country and city level), of city governance, and of city performance (access and quality 
of service delivery).  This city database integrates existing data with new data gathered 
specifically for this research project.
3  
 
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 provides a discussion of conceptual and 
definitional issues on city globalization, providing a partial survey of the literature. In 
Section 3 we discuss the issue of urban governance in the context of globalization and 
review some of the relevant literature to capture the dynamics of city performance.  Section 
4 provides simplified hypotheses on the globalization and governance nexus in explaining 
city-level performance in terms of service delivery, includes a working definition of urban 
governance, and presents a reduced-form model specification to test key hypotheses.  
Section 4 also describes the extended city level dataset we have compiled, comprising data 
on 412 cities in 134 countries, from which we make use of over 35 variables.
4  In this 
section we also present in brief the results, both in terms of simple summary charts 
synthesizing the uncontrolled correlations, as well as the econometric specifications and the 
synthesis of the econometric results of the determinants of city performance. Given the 
extensive set of variables in the dataset, and multiple econometric specifications, we 
present synthesis tables and graphs summarizing the main econometric results.  
 
In Section 5 we present the results of the preliminary empirical investigation of the 
potential determinants of city governance. Future research questions are dealt with in the 
concluding section, where we also present emerging policy implications from this analysis. 
 
 
2  City Performance in the Context of Globalization 
 
There are two main threads in the literature that treat the subject of globalization of cities, 
which mostly refer to the term “world city” to describe the phenomenon.  We take the 
theoretical underpinnings of this definition from the work of Doel and Hubbard (2002), 
who clarify key definitions and develop the conceptualization of globalization of cities.  
The two conceptualizations of world cities that we draw from include the following 
definitions: 
 
                                                 
3   See Annex D for the list of cities in the current version of the database.  We use various sources of data for 
this analysis, detailed in the Annex.  First, a comprehensive city level data set is taken from the UN Urban 
Observatory which has data on 232 cities in 114 countries for the year 1998.  We refer to this database as the 
UN database.  We also use data from the GaWC research which we call the Taylor database, which includes a 
roster of 265 cities constructed from data on the number of firms (advertising, accounting, banking, and law) 
and number of practitioners/offices in 265 cities for the year 2000.  We construct a special database which we 
refer to as the KLM (Kaufmann, Léautier, Mastruzzi) database which includes data in 412 cities from 134 
countries for the year 2003, based in large part from a worldwide enterprise survey (EOS).  This database 
consists of 36 variables of governance as well as city and country economic data.   
4 The expanded city level dataset includes over a hundred variables.  However, since part of this consolidated 
dataset is aggregated from different existing data sources comprising a different set of cities, the consolidated 
dataset contains many missing values. One of the objectives for the future is to build up this city level dataset 
and fill in these data gaps.   4
1.  Globalized City as a place: a city is a location within the world, defined with 
precise city boundaries, but plugged into a global space of flows such as foreign 
direct investment that comes along with the decisions companies make to locate 
in particular cities, as well as the flow of people who come to work for these 
companies in terms of personnel in the country or key people visiting for 
business purposes, and in the flow of goods and services that are produced by 
these companies as they decide to locate in a particular city.  In such a 
definition, a global city would get value out of its indigenous characteristics 
such as its past investments in critical infrastructure and the quality of its 
institutions.  But in particular such a city would also get benefits from the 
decisions of companies to locate in that city and conduct economic activities 
such as banking, finance, accounting, legal services, or advertising.  Urban 
politicians and city managers would be concerned about bringing local value to 
their citizens, reacting to events that impact the city on a global scale, and 
creating strategies to adapt the city to best advantage.  They would therefore be 
seeking out to attract such companies or make sure they stay in the city, 
providing the key inputs and incentives such firms and their related personnel 
would need.   
 
2.  Globalized City as a sustained achievement of performances whether measured 
as the quality of services a city provides to its citizens (access to telephone 
services, water, sewerage, or electricity), the reliability of such services over 
time (such as measured by the quality of infrastructure services), and the degree 
to which a city involves its citizens in decision-making, is responsive to their 
demands, and the way it is governed in general.  Such a city would have 
relationships with other cities and key players in the global economy such as 
people, firms, and organizations that are distributed, with varying degrees of 
clustering and dispersion across the world-city network.  Urban politicians 
would strive to sustain good performance, and would interact with citizens and 
firms to make choices on investment at the city level as well as ensure the 
delivery of key services.  How such politicians govern is as important as what 
services they deliver in such a definition. 
 
The first definition of a globalized city refers to cities which have a leadership role at the 
international scale, are externally oriented towards a global economy, have a high ranking 
in the world’s urban hierarchy, or serve as a major gateway for migration.  Such cities have 
existed as far back as the sixteenth century.  Knox (2002) highlights the fact that there has 
been a shifting of the position that cities have had in the world, when you look at how they 
have organized trade or geopolitical strategies beyond their boundaries.  Cities like 
London, Amsterdam, Antwerp, Genoa, Lisbon, and Venice were key global players in the 
seventeenth century.  In the eighteenth century cities like Paris, Rome, and Vienna became 
main players in the world, while Antwerp and Genoa lost influence.  In the nineteenth 
century Venice lost some of its influence while cities like Berlin, New York, and St. 
Petersburg joined the league of world cities.  The shifting in and out of global influence, 
demonstrated by the example of a city such as Genoa, however, supports the second 
definition of a globalized city, as an outcome of decisions made by firms and individuals,   5
which we wish to explore.  We would like to investigate empirically what determines the 
staying power of cities in their performance on a global scale, and whether governance has 
anything to do it. 
 
Empirical analyses that have been done using the first definition of a globalized city—a 
city as a place interacting with the global space—have included a number of indicators 
such as the seven defined by Friedman (1986): (a) the financial assets of a city such as its 
capital and equity markets; (b) a city’s endowment of key infrastructure which firms and 
citizens would respond to in terms of their decisions to locate there, exit to alternative 
options, or push to get governance reforms that would allow them to receive improved 
services;
5 (c) the size of the city in terms of its population with the assumption that benefits 
of agglomeration are important; (d) the availability and concentration of key business 
services and  advanced producer services such as credit rating, risk management, and multi-
jurisdictional law; (e) the importance of a city’s manufacturing output; (f) how many 
Transnational Corporations have located their headquarters in a city; and (g) the presence 
of international institutions in the city. 
 
Other authors have used indicators such as the presence of internet domain names 
(Townsend, 2001); the extent of public-private partnerships (Kresl, 1995); measures of 
cultural vitality (Smith and Timberlake, 1995); the proportion of foreign residents in the 
city (Doel and Hubbard, 2002); and the numbers of service sector employees in the city 
(Doel and Hubbard, 2002). 
 
Very few authors have carried out empirical investigation using the second definition of 
globalized cities, which considers scale (size of a city, size of its economy including the 
size of private sector activity) or services (access to infrastructure and social services) as 
something produced rather than given, requiring cities to constantly perform to remain 
influential in a global world.  New literature which focuses on connectivity of cities within 
a network includes that of Sassen, (2000), Castells, (2000), and Doel and Hubbard (2002).  
Uncovering the variables that drive the dynamics of city growth and performance interests 
us, and we particularly look at the role of governance, using a set of empirical tests. 
 
From the data we have been able to gather from various sources, we can look at the effect 
of both the scale issue as well as the quality of services and investigate the Friedman 
(1986) and Townsend (2001) hypotheses.
6   
                                                 
5 Kyu Sik Lee and Alex Anas in “The Benefits of Alternative Power Tariffs for Nigeria and Indonesia” 
(1996), demonstrate how companies locate in a city and if they do not find the services they need either invest 
in their own generation, thereby exiting the system, or put pressure to get better services, with potential 
improvements in local governance, or relocate to cities with better services. 
6 The Taylor database gives us data on financial/banking companies located in a city, as well as data on the 
availability of key companies in law, accounting, and advertising, all measures of indicators (a), (d), and (f) in 
the Friedman (1986) hypothesis.  From the UN and KLM databases we get measures of key infrastructure 
endowments (indicator (b)).  City size (indicator (c)) is obtained from the website: 
http://www.citypopulation.de.  We use the Kearney composite measure of globalization for measure (e) and 
have collected web statistics that show whether a city has a website and if it posts budget information or 
business information there to capture the Townsend (2001) indicators.  The only measure we do not use in 
our analysis is the presence of international institutions in the city.    6
 
In latter sections, we develop and implement a simple framework to study empirically the 
potential determinants of urban performance, within which globalization is hypothesized to 
be an important factor.  From that perspective, we are to view the two definitions of a 
globalized city as complementary rather than as alternative hypotheses.  Simply, the first 
definition above of a globalized city (particularly regarding ‘companies locate in their cities 
and conduct economic activities such as banking, finance, accounting, legal services, or 
advertising’) is to be seen as a potential input to sound urban performance, while the 
second definition (‘achievement of performances’, including service delivery and quality of 
governance) is to be seen as the output or outcome of various inputs (including whether the 
city is global or not).  In this respect, to avoid a quasi-tautology, we move away from 
equating the second view with a global city, instead regarding it simply as urban 
performance outcomes.
7   
 
We therefore posit the simple view that the two definitions of a global city are not 
necessarily substitutes or competing with each other, but potentially complementary, the 
first notion potentially being a determinant of city performance. Such a construction builds 
on the Tiebout (1956) hypothesis of “voting with your feet” and allows us to accept 
endogeneity.  A city with good performance in terms of amenities it provides to its citizens 
(schools, health services, parks) attracts more migrant residents who “vote” to locate there.  
Such cities would therefore grow in size and if size of a city gives it advantage in a global 
world, the issue of “performance” may have an endogenous component, similarly with 
respect to location of firms.  The dynamics of such a construct dictate that well performing 




3  Urban Governance in the Context of Globalization 
 
 
3.1  Governance and Globalization at the Country level: basic definitions  
 
In the recent past, much work has been done on globalization and on governance at the 
country level.  While this is not the main focus of the paper (and thus we do not provide a 
literature review), it is of relevance to briefly review the notions of governance and 
globalization at the country level for two reasons.  First, as background to these same twin 
notions, but at the city level, which will be covered in more detail.  And second, because 
country level variables may also obviously matter significantly as determinants of city-
level performance.   
                                                 
7 In the ‘Popperian falsifiability’ sense, taking the second definition of global city as is would not be very 
useful to test the hypothesis that global cities perform better.  Thus, we obviate such a problem by 
interpreting the first definition as a potential input and the second definition as an outcome (to be empirically 
tested).   
   7
We have defined country-level governance as the exercise of authority through formal and 
informal traditions and institutions for the common good, thus encompassing: (1) the 
process of selecting, monitoring, and replacing governments; (2) the capacity to formulate 
and implement sound policies and deliver public services, and (3) the respect of citizens 
and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them. 
The three dimensions in this definition of governance are then further unbundled to 
comprise two measurable concepts per dimension, for a total of six components: (1) voice 
and external accountability (i.e., the government’s preparedness to be externally 
accountable through citizen feedback and democratic institutions, and a competitive press); 
and also (2) political stability and lack of violence, crime, and terrorism. Then (3) 
government effectiveness (including quality of policymaking, bureaucracy, and public 
service delivery); (4) lack of regulatory burden; and, finally, (5) rule of law (protection of 
property rights, judiciary independence, and so on); and (6) control of corruption.  These 
components are subject to empirical measurement at the country level, for which a 




3.2  Defining Urban Governance 
 
Despite the fewer numbers of citations that can be found in the literature search which give 
access to specific empirical data sets that are comparable, there is no lack of citations on 
the definition and use of the term “urban governance”.  In simple terms, UNESCO defines 
urban governance as the processes that steer and take into account the various links 
between stakeholders, local authorities and citizens. It involves bottom-up and top-down 
strategies to favor active participation of communities concerned, negotiation among 
actors, transparent decision-making mechanisms, and innovation in strategies of urban 
management policies.
9  More comprehensively, one can find definitions of urban 
governance, as well as descriptions of potential indicators of urban governance in the work 
of Mehta (1998) and the UNCHS (1999). 
 
Mehta (1998) looks at urban governance through a set of attributes.  He introduces the 
attribute of accountability which he suggests is derived from how cities manage their 
finances, communicate on use of funds and achievements to their citizens, and adhere to 
legal requirements and administrative policies.  Embedded in Mehta’s concept of 
accountability is the question of responsiveness, which includes the ability of a 
decentralized entity to determine and respond to the needs of its constituents.  In doing so, 
city officials need to have processes of citizen participation, and a system for monitoring 
and evaluation, as well as reporting on results achieved.  These three measures are critical 
if one is using the definition of a city as a place, where it is performing with respect to local 
issues, and managing the consequences of globalization locally.   
 
If we consider the other definition of a globalized city, as an outcome of globalization but 
also shaping its role within a globalized world then we need to look at dynamic indicators 
                                                 
8  See Kaufmann, Kraay, Mastruzzi, Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators for 1996–2002, World 
Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3106. 
9 http://www.unesco.org/most/most2.htm   8
of governance.  In addition to the static attributes of accountability, responsiveness, and 
participation, Mehta also includes a dynamic concept of urban governance which he calls 
management innovation, which measures the degree to which urban managers have been 
able to successfully implement changes in their systems of administration to achieve 
superior performance.  Mehta introduces three measures which relate to the ability of cities 
to transform global opportunities to local value.  These include measures such as public-
private partnerships, local government-citizen interaction, and networking.   
 
The ability of cities to engage in public-private partnerships is seen as a key capability for 
staying power in a global scene by a number of authors (see Doel and Hubbard (2002) and 
Knox (2002)).  Mehta suggests measures such as presence of business sector initiatives to 
improve efficiency of local government functioning, as well as the degree to which 
implementation of policies and incentive schemes exist to encourage private sector 
participation in development.  Linking back to the literature on global cities, such 
indicators would be relevant due to the consideration that strategic decisions by 
Transnational Corporations to operate in a given city are based on their determination of 
the advantages of locating there and would therefore depend on the quality of engagement 
with the local government in key areas as well as the local investment climate they would 
face. 
 
Having city governments interact with citizens and non-governmental organizations, opens 
up the space for introducing the global civil society in decision-making at the local level.  
Cities with a large diaspora that is actively involved in local decisions are one example but 
so are the networks of civil society that interact on a global scale with respect to local 
issues (see Sassen (2002)). 
 
Mehta’s definition of urban governance also allows us to introduce the concept of 
networking of one city with other cities or with key actors such as firms, labor unions and 
business associations, but also other states.  He suggests a number of indicators of 
networking such as the number of inter-city, regional, and international networks as well as 
the extent of technological interchange and collaboration.  Other measures suggested are 
the exchange between cities of expertise and training.  The recent example of the city of 
Rome sending experts to Kigali, indicates the extent to which this indicator is relevant. 
 
Urban governance as an outcome that is visible to a citizen is a key feature that allows 
empirical tests of the city as a place or as a sustained achievement of performances.  There 
are very few existing indicators that can be used to capture dynamic changes in governance 
at the city level.  We draw on measures defined by authors such as Mehta (1998) and the 
UNCHS (1999) which include: (1) consumer satisfaction (survey/complaints); (2) openness 
of procedures for contracts/tenders for municipal services; (3) percentage of population 
served by services; and (4) access of the public to stages of the policy cycle
10.   
                                                 
10 The UNCHS Expert Group Meeting on Urban Poverty and Governance Indicators, 29 April to 1 May 1999, 
Nairobi, Kenya highlights the top twelve indicators of urban governance which include: (1) consumer 
satisfaction; (2) openness of procedures for contracts/tenders for municipal services; (3) equity in the tax 
system; (4) sources of local government funding (taxes, user charges, borrowing, central government, 
international aid); (5) percentage of population served by services; (6) access of public to stages of policy   9
 
With these measures, we construct a vector of urban governance indicators which we use to 
test the impact of urban governance on city performance.  The vector consists of measures 
of voice and participation and transparency and accountability which we take from the UN 
database.  We also use measures like illegal financing, state capture, bribery in utility, and 
bribery in judiciary from the Kaufmann, Léautier, and Mastruzzi (KLM) database.  Finally, 
we construct a dynamic indicator of city transparency which uses proxies like, whether a 
city has a web page, what information is included in the web page, whether the city budget 
is publicly available on the web or whether companies can register on the web.  Note that 
this indicator captures similar aspects as the one described earlier in Section 2 and 




3.3  Defining the Impact of Urban Governance on Globalized Cities 
 
A ‘globalized city’ as an enduring performance is a concept worth testing empirically.  We 
can ask “what aspects of governance give cities this capability to constantly translate the 
global complexities into an advantage to them which can be seen in the way they treat their 
citizens (access to services, quality of services); attract firms to invest (public-private 
partnerships, FDI, firm location); or measures such as maintaining economic growth over 
several years and increasing the average per capita income of a city’s citizens.  Doel and 
Hubbard (2002) suggest that a globalized city is always a work in progress being shaped 
and managed by firms, states, sectors, and cities.  Thus a city which has good governance 
should be able to perform well and remain in the league of important global cities as well 
as deliver value to its citizens.   
 
The literature on globalization and urban governance has two schools of thought on the 
importance of globalization for the performance of cities.  There are those who argue that 
cities can be well performing if they have sufficient spatial agglomeration of know-how 
and capacity in the city and that a city’s international competitiveness is quite different 
from the concept of an international city (Kresl, 1995 p.54).  Their superior performance in 
delivering local value to their citizens can come from their interaction with the rural 
hinterland, as well as with cities within the same country.  Thus, well governed cities that 
are not highly globalized would fit in this category, where we would expect that such cities 
would be well performing because they are well governed rather than because they are 
globalized. 
 
Others argue that successful cities will be those that are considered world cities, that deliver 
local value through interpreting and tapping into global opportunities (Doel and Hubbard, 
2002).  Such cities would be attending to their own position in a global space of flows, and 
will be well governed not only in local terms but also in global terms.  Their ability to 
remain well performing cities in a globalized world is determined by their constant 
                                                                                                                                                    
cycle; (7) fairness in enforcing laws; (8) incorporation of excluded groups in the consultation process; (9) 
clarity of procedures and regulations and responsibilities; (10) existing participatory processes; (11) freedom 
of the media and existence of local media; and (12) autonomy of financial resources.   10
attention to good governance.  De Long and Shleifer (1992) have used such a construct to 
look at the differential performance of cities that were ruled by princes (little voice and 
participation by citizens and merchants) and those ruled by merchants (more voice for 
citizens and firms).  Because they have a long time series (from the 2
nd to the 19
th century, 
they are able to test the relationship between good governance (measured by voice) and 
city performance (measured by city population/size).  
 
 
3.4  Capturing the Staying Power of Cities in a Globalized World 
 
Another important consideration is the one of scale.  If scale is something produced rather 
than given (as pointed out by Doel and Hubbard (2002)), then the size of cities is an 
outcome of contingent encounters between cities, firms, individuals, and sectors (business 
associations, labor unions etc). This means that in due course (when sufficient time series 
data becomes available) one should also aim to gather “emergent governance indicators” 
which would allow us to look at the changes in governance over time as a result of 
globalization.
11 We use a function that allows us to include variables at both city and 
country-level globalization as an input to delivering service performance within a city, as 
well as globalization as an outcome of good governance.  In this manner, governance 
achievements provide the environment in which cities can perform better and hence tap 




3.5  Capturing the Dynamics of Globalization 
 
Measures that are important to capture both the dynamics of globalization as well as the 
staying power of cities include concepts of connectivity, flow and traffic which can be 
measured by indicators defined by Doel and Hubbard (2002) such as volume and direction 
of flow of people (via international migration); flow of capital (via international banking); 
flow of products (via import and export); flow of ideas (via broadcasting and the media); 
and flow of pollution (via dumping policies) or even crime (drugs, human traffic, money 
laundering).  These measures would change over time and it is the direction of change as 
well as continuity of flows at given levels that define the staying power of cities.  This 
definition posits the capability of cities to translate complex relationships at various levels 
into an advantage and this capacity to translate is rarer than the capacity to command or 
control.   
 
In its most concise definition, globalization “simply refers to the complex of forces that 
trend toward a single world society. Among these forces are mass communications, 
commerce, increased ease of travel, the internet, popular culture, and the increasingly 
                                                 
11 This would permit, inter alia, to answer questions such as: do cities/countries that have an improving trend 
in governance also continue to perform better in terms of their degree of globalization and their ability to 
translate global opportunities into local value or both?, and would the scale of a city be a good measure of 
such a phenomenon?     11
widespread use of English as an international language.”
12  Globalization has most often 
been analyzed at the country level.  Sources of data and analysis judging country level 
globalization as a dynamic concept are rare.  Some authors use rankings of countries on a 
number of dimensions of globalization, such as the work of A.T. Kearney (Foreign Policy, 
2002) who use a composite index of globalization.  This index builds on indicators of trade, 
finance, personal contact, and information exchange.  Using the Kearney data base, we 
investigate the issue of country level globalization and its impact on city performance, with 
cities judged on the ability to sustain a track record of services to their citizens. 
 
For globalization at the city level, we utilize data from the GaWC research (Taylor, 
Walker, 2000), which has city level data constructed from a superposition of networks of 
accountancy, advertising, banking/finance, insurance, law, and management consultancy 
firms—the business services indicators of Friedman (1986).  This data base demonstrates 
the “unevenness of globalization” when one looks at the concentration of cities by region 
for example.  We refer to this as the Taylor database.  With such data, we can pursue the 
question of why some cities are left behind in globalization.   
 
 
4  Determinants of City Performance: Key Hypothesis Tests and 
Simple Model Specification 
 
Because of the paucity of comparable data on cities worldwide, we need to be nimble on 
the model specification we use.  We search for a specification that allows us to capture the 
dynamics of globalization, governance and performance of cities, as well as define specific 
hypotheses to be tested. 
 
 
4.1  A Simple Framework 
 
We specifically consider the role that governance plays at different levels of globalization 
of cities.  The schematic chart below allows us to pursue this analysis empirically.  We 
distinguish between three dimensions; two of which are ‘inputs’ (quality of governance and 
extent of city globalization, in the vertical and horizontal axis, respectively), and one an 
outcome (service delivery/city performance, in the ‘virtual’ third dimension in the chart, 
illustrated in the chart by the 45 degree diagonal line).  With such a schematic chart we 








                                                 
12 http://www.progressiveliving.org    12
Chart 1: City governance and extent of globalization  
as potential determinants of city performance 
 
 
Hypotheses to be tested: Governance and globalization interact, and do matter for city 
performance.   
 
Hypothesis 1: Governance matters.   
We first ask: can a city be well-performing regardless of whether it is a ‘local’ or ‘global’ 
city, significantly driven by its good governance?  And, more specifically, would a ‘local’ 
city necessarily have to exhibit good governance to ‘compensate’ and be able perform, i.e. 
could a city be located in quadrant II and still likely to be well performing?.  We posit that, 
governance matters significantly for city performance, controlling for its level of 
globalization.  While a ‘local’ city could exceptionally exhibit good performance, this is 
highly unlikely unless the city exhibits relatively high levels of governance.   
 
Governance in this specification is an endowment that allows a city to perform well either 
locally or globally.  In other words, we can test if a well performing city, whether local or 
global, has good governance, hence measuring the independent value added of governance 
to a local city or to a global city.  The added value of governance for a local city is then the 












































Performance   13
while the added value of governance for a global city is the differential performance of a 
city in Quadrant IV compared to one in Quadrant III. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Globalization matters.   
We can then also test whether a global city is better performing than a local city, for a 
given quality of governance (whether for a given level of good governance, i.e. comparing 
quadrants I and IV, or poor governance, as in quadrants II vs. III, which would measure the 
independent effect of globalization on city performance).  From the literature, it is expected 
that a city that is global is able to attain such global status because of specific actions taken 
by its political leadership or by its citizens, as well as the firms that locate within such a 
city.  We would expect citizens of global cities to have better quality and access to services 
such as water, sewerage, electricity and telephones than local cities. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Globalization and governance interact positively.   
While in principle it is conceivable that a city could compensate for its ‘local’ (vs. global) 
character by exhibiting good governance, in practice the dynamics of good governance may 
point to a linkage between globalization and governance: those cities that globalize, bring 
about the checks and balances of competition (say by the discipline imposed by FDI and 
credit markets), as well as the techniques, that are likely to positively impact on city 
governance.  In turn, improved governance, involving transparency, control of corruption 
and property rights protection, may attract further demand and pressures for a local city to 
become more global.
 13  Thus, a dynamic virtuous circle may be at play in which 
globalization and governance interactive positively to further improve performance.  In 
particular, we will empirically investigate whether good governance is less likely in local 
cities, and thus whether becoming a global city, and a globalized country, helps improve 
city governance.   
 
Thus, in terms of schematic chart 1, we would expect that the worst performance would 
take place in cities in quadrant II (poorly governed local city).  If it attempts to attain higher 
levels of globalization, that is unlikely to take place without pressures to take measures to 
also improve governance.  Thus, a rapid and fully horizontal move out of quadrant II to 
quadrant IV, or a rapid and fully vertical move to quadrant I, are less likely than either the 
city staying within a low equilibrium trap, or moving out of such a low level quadrant II 





                                                 
13 Taylor defines alpha cities as those with global significance in four key global city functions (international 
accountancy, advertising, banking, and legal services).  A beta city is one that has global significance in three 
of the four key world-city (global city) functions.  A gamma city is one that has global significance in two of 
the four key global city functions.  Using the network aspects of the GaWC is a key advantage that we 
consider in looking at the issue of governance, asking questions like: “Is it that less globalized cities are 
relatively less well governed and that results in them trailing even further behind?”  We group cities into two 
categories of “global” and “local” to present some of the results in charts that visually capture the main 
empirical findings. 
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4.2  Simple Model Specification.   
 
A very simple model specification to analyze what emerges from these hypotheses tests is 
advanced as follows:  
 
(1)  Y = f(X, Z, c, C) + ε   
 
Y = city performance as measured by a vector of qualitative service variables which 
include access to water supply, sewerage, electricity, and telephones from the UN 
dataset, as well as the overall quality of infrastructure services and electricity 
supply, access to telephones and/or cell phones and access to internet in schools, 
using the EOS database; 
 
X = measure of globalization at the city level, which we specify using the Taylor 
dataset as the total number of offices of major international advertising, accounting, 
and financial firms in a city; 
 
Z = vector of governance indicators, which includes control of corruption, bribery 
in utility, and state capture, largely drawn from the EOS database; 
 
c = other city characteristics, such as city size, whether it is the capital city, and/or a 
port, as well as availability of websites and availability of information on city 
budget and business regulations in such websites; 
 
C=country characteristics, such as income level, size, extent of urbanization, and 
degree of globalization at the country level, and, 
ε = error term. 
 
 
4.3  Data description and Mapping of Variables 
 
The KLM database, which integrates existing data with newly collected data and 
indicators, covering a total of 412 cities in 134 countries, was constructed by drawing from 
a variety of sources.  Each variable we utilize in this paper is listed in Table 1 below.  From 
the UN Observatory (1998), we downloaded 4 service access/performance variables, 
covering about 80 cities in 60 countries.  From the enterprise-specific EOS survey database 
(2003), we construct city-specific averages for 12 governance indicators, as well as 5 
service access/performance variables, covering 271 cities in 101 countries (see Table 1 
below for details).  For instance, two governance-related variables for which we 
constructed city-wide averages, were frequency of bribery in utility, and the extent of state 
capture (from firms’ reports on the distortionary impact on competition of illegal payments 
made by certain firms) to influence government policies, laws or regulations.  From the 
Taylor database, we downloaded the number of offices of major advertising, accounting 
and financial firms in each city and we constructed a “global city” variable by adding up 
the three variables, covering a total of 261 cities in 114 countries. 
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In addition, we also constructed indicators through internet searches, for particular city 
attributes, such as city population, existence of city websites and availability of data on 
budget and business regulations in such websites.  We completed this list of city attributes 
by including two dummies for whether the city is the country’s capital and/or a port. 
 
At the country level, we draw from the variable “Control of Corruption” from the 
Worldwide Aggregate Governance Indicators discussed above, where corruption 
(conventionally defined as the exercise of public power for private gain) is one of its 
components.  The indicator is the aggregate of many individual sources, covering several 
aspects of corruption, ranging from administrative corruption to “grand corruption” in the 
political arena and “state capture”.  We also constructed an income per capita variable 
(PPP) by drawing from the Heston-Summers database and the CIA World Factbook (2001).  
For globalization at the country level, we draw from the A.T. Kearney/Foreign Policy 
Globalization Index.  It tracks and assesses changes in four key components of global 
integration, incorporating such measures as trade and financial flows, movement of people 
across borders, international telephone traffic, Internet usage, and participation in 
international treaties and peacekeeping operations.  It covers 62 countries, including 
industrialized and emerging economies.
14   In Table 1 below we present the legend of all 
the variables we utilize in the empirical testing of these hypotheses, and their sources and 
characteristics.   
                                                 
14 Specifically, in this index, economic integration combines data on trade, foreign direct investment (FDI), 
and portfolio capital flows, as well as investment income payments and receipts. Personal contact tracks 
international travel and tourism, international telephone traffic, and cross-border remittances and personal 
transfers (including worker remittances, compensation to employees, and other person-to-person and 
nongovernmental transfers). Technological connectivity counts the number of Internet users, Internet hosts, 
and secure servers through which encrypted transactions are carried out. Finally, political engagement tracks 
each country's memberships in international organizations, personnel and financial contributions to U.N. 
Security Council missions, ratification of selected multilateral international treaties, and the amount of 
governmental transfer payments and receipts. 
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Table 1: Variable Legend and Data Sources 
 
 
Variable Description / Source Range / direction Country Cities
City Variables
Access to Water UN Observatory, 1998 % 61 83
Access to Sewerage UN Observatory, 1998 % 57 78
Access to Electricity UN Observatory, 1998 % 61 81
Access to Telephone Lines 1 UN Observatory, 1998 % 51 58
Access to Telephone Lines 2 EOS, 2003 1 (bad) - 7 (good) 101 271
Quality of Infrastructure EOS, 2003 1 (bad) - 7 (good) 101 271
Quality of Electricity EOS, 2003 1 (bad) - 7 (good) 101 271
Access to Cell Phones EOS, 2003 1 (bad) - 7 (good) 101 271
Access to Internet in schools EOS, 2003 1 (bad) - 7 (good) 101 271
Bribery in Utility EOS, 2003 1 (bad) - 7 (good) 101 271
State Capture EOS, 2003 1 (bad) - 7 (good) 101 271
Informal Money Laundering EOS, 2003 1 (bad) - 7 (good) 101 271
Street Crime EOS, 2003 1 (bad) - 7 (good) 101 271
Red Tape Cost of Imports EOS, 2003 1 (good) - 9 (bad) 101 271
Bribery to Affect Laws EOS, 2003 1 (bad) - 7 (good) 101 271
Diversion Public Funds EOS, 2003 1 (bad) - 7 (good) 101 271
Illegal Party Financing EOS, 2003 1 (bad) - 7 (good) 101 271
Bribery in Permits EOS, 2003 1 (bad) - 7 (good) 101 271
Bribery in Tax EOS, 2003 1 (bad) - 7 (good) 101 271
Soundness of Banks EOS, 2003 1 (bad) - 7 (good) 101 271
Trust in Politicians EOS, 2003 1 (bad) - 7 (good) 101 271
Organized Crime EOS, 2003 1 (bad) - 7 (good) 101 271
Quality of Postal System EOS, 2003 1 (bad) - 7 (good) 101 271
Health Access Gap EOS, 2003 1 (bad) - 7 (good) 101 271
Global City
Offices of major advertising, 




Source:  www.citypopulation.de, 
2001
Logs 134 410
Website Dummy City has a website (KLM 2003) 0 - 1 (yes) 133 398
Business Dummy
City website has info on how to 
start a business (KLM 2003)
0 - 1 (yes) 133 398
Budget Dummy
City website has info on city 
budget (KLM 2003)
0 - 1 (yes) 133 398
Port Dummy
City has port facilities (KLM 
2003)
0 - 1 (yes) 134 411
Capital Dummy City is the capital (KLM 2003) 0 - 1 (yes) 134 411
Country Variables
Globalization (Kearney) Journal of Foreign Policy, 2002 0 (close) - 1 (open) 59 254
Control of Corruption Governance Indicator, KK 2002 -2.5 (bad) / 2.5 (good) 134 411
Country Population WDI 2003 Logs 134 411
Urbanization








4.4  Determinants of City Performance: Main Empirical Results 
 
First we performed a simple univariate, or at most, bivariate, testing of whether 
globalization and/or governance are highly and significantly related to city performance.  In 
simplified chart form, we first present these results in Figures 1a through 1i, which 
summarize the initial empirical support for the main hypotheses we test.  These figures 
present the results utilizing only the sample of emerging and transition economies (‘non-
OECD’), as a simple way of quasi-controlling for large income differentials (indeed, the 
differences are even larger with the full sample, not depicted in the figures, but shown in 
subsequent tables below).  The figures below present the differential performance that a 
global (vs. local) city makes on a vector of performance in services such as access to 
telephones [1]
15 (1a), sewerage (1b), water (1c), electricity (1d), overall quality of 
infrastructure (1e), access to telephones [2] (1f), access to cell phones (1g), access to 
internet in schools (1h) and quality of electricity supply (1i).   
 
Further, by the simple sample segmentation and calculation performed for each panel of 
Figure 1, we can also depict here the difference that good governance can make.  This is 
done utilizing three measures of governance, of which one is a country average (control of 
corruption), and the other two are at the city level (bribery in utility, and state capture).  
 
We find that governance is significantly associated with performance, both for local and 
global cities.  Well governed cities, whether local or global, perform better than poorly 
governed ones across all quality and access to service variables.  The performance 
advantage of well governed cities holds across all three measures of governance and all 
service variables except access to the electricity grid in global cities. 
 
Globalization has a more nuanced impact on city performance.  We find that on balance 
global cities do perform better than local cities.  However, the differences are not that 
marked, and they vary depending on the type of service.  In particular, the difference 
between local and global cities is clear for certain services, such as quality of infrastructure, 
yet non-existent for access to electricity, for instance.  The rest of the services rate lies in 
between such extremes both in terms of magnitude of its impact (often modest) as well as 
varying levels of significance.   
 
Consistent with the depiction of some of the results in the various panels of Figure 1 above, 
we present the fuller set of average rating results for all relevant variables in the Table 2 
below, for each one of the relevant samples (full sample, OECD, and non-OECD).  From 
tables 2a, 2b, and 2c, we can clearly detect a strong positive correlation between city 
performance as measured by service access and the extent of globalization (both at city and 
country level), regardless of sample.  Similarly, there appears to be a strong positive 
correlation between city performance/service access and city and country governance. In 
conclusion, more globalized cities are better performing, and better governed cities are well 
performing.  Cities in well governed countries are also better performing. 
                                                 
15 As per table 1, access to telephones [1] is drawn from UN Observatory, 1998 and measures the percentage 
of the population with access to telephones. Access to telephones [2] is drawn from EOS, 2003 and captures 
on a scale from 1-7 the availability of new telephone lines for business.   18
Figure 1a
Access to Telephones (1), City Governance and 






























Control of  
Corruption
B ribery in Utility State 
Capture
Control of  
Corruption





Sources:  EOS 2003, UN 1998, KK 2002 & KLM 2004  
 
Figure 1b




























Control of  
Corruption
B ribery in Utility
State Capture
Control of  
Corruption
B ribery in Utility State Capture
Local City
Global City
Sources:  EOS 2003, UN 1998, KK 2002 & KLM  2004  
 
Figure 1c

























Control of  
Corruption
B ribery in Utility State Capture Control of 
Corruption
B ribery in Utility State Capture
Local City
Global City
Sources:  EOS 2003, UN 1998, KK 2002 & KLM 2004    19
Figure 1d
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Figure 1e
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Figure 1g
Access to Cell Phones, City Governance and 
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TABLE 2a: City Performance by Levels of Globalization and 
Governance – Full Sample (412 Cities) 
Average Ratings 
GLOBALIZATION GOVERNANCE 


















    Low  High Low  High Poor Good Poor Good Poor  Good 
Access to Sewerage (%, UN)  62%  94% 75% 99% 55% 91% 60% 89% 62%  95% 
Access  to  Water  (%,  UN)  75% 95% 81%  100% 68% 96% 72% 94% 73%  98% 
Access to Electricity (%, UN)  90%  94% 90%  100% 82% 95% 83% 95% 85%  100% 
Access to Telephone lines 1 (%, UN)  46%  80% 60% 95% 37% 79% 41% 80% 40%  89% 
Access to telephone lines 2 (1-7, 
EOS)  4.8 6.0 5.4 6.4 4.4 6.2 4.6 6.0 4.6  6.2 
Access  to  Cellular  phones  (1-7,  EOS)  5.7 6.5 6.1 6.7 5.5 6.5 5.6 6.4 5.6  6.5 
Access to Internet in schools (1-7, 
EOS)  2.9 4.7 3.7 5.3 2.9 4.8 3.0 4.7 2.9  5.0 
Quality  of  Infrastructure  (1-7,  EOS)  3.1 5.0 3.5 5.5 2.9 4.7 2.9 4.7 2.9  5.0 
Quality  of  Electricity  (1-7,  EOS)  3.9 5.6 4.4 6.2 3.6 5.7 3.8 5.4 3.7  5.8 
                                
Overall  Number  of  Cities  132 129 131 123 137 134 136 135 211  201 
Note: Each column variable was segmented into two equal samples, below and above the median 
value of the  full sample. 
 
TABLE 2b: City Performance by Levels of Globalization and 
Governance – Non OECD Sample (274 Cities) 
Average Ratings 
GLOBALIZATION GOVERNANCE 


















    Low  High Low  High Poor Good Poor Good Poor Good
Access to Sewerage (%, UN)  57%  72% 71% 79% 50% 87% 51% 82% 56% 72% 
Access  to  Water  (%,  UN)  74% 79% 78% 85% 64% 93% 66% 88% 70% 81% 
Access to Electricity (%, UN)  87%  90% 88% 92% 80% 93% 80% 92% 83% 90% 
Access to Telephone lines 1 (%, UN)  43%  57% 48% 76% 32% 74% 38% 64% 37% 59% 
Access to telephone lines 2 (1-7, 
EOS)  4.4 5.1 5.4 5.4 4.2 5.6 4.4 5.4 4.1 5.6 
Access to Cellular phones (1-7, EOS)  5.4  6.1  6.2  6.1  5.4  6.2  5.5  6.0  5.4  6.1 
Access to Internet in schools (1-7, 
EOS)  2.4 3.3 3.5 3.9 2.7 4.0 2.8 3.9 2.6 4.1 
Quality of Infrastructure (1-7, EOS)  2.6  3.7  3.5  3.4  2.8  3.8  2.7  3.9  2.7  3.8 
Quality of Electricity (1-7, EOS)  3.6  4.4  4.2  4.5  3.4  4.8  3.6  4.6  3.4  4.8 
                                
Overall Number of Cities  70  65  61  61  102  102  106  98  138  136 
Note: Each column variable was segmented into two equal samples, below and above the median 
value of the full sample. 
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TABLE 2c: City Performance by Levels of Globalization and 
Governance – OECD Sample (138 Cities) 
Average Ratings 
GLOBALIZATION GOVERNANCE 
 CITY PERFORMANCE 















    Low  High  Low  High Poor Good Poor Good Poor Good 
Access to Sewerage (%, UN)  98%  100%  99% 100% 98% 100% 98% 100% 99% 100% 
Access to Water (%, UN)  99%  100%  100% 100% 100% 100% 100%  100%  99%  100% 
Access to Electricity (%, UN)  100%  100%  100% 100% 100% 100% 100%  100%  100%  100% 
Access to Telephone lines 1 (%, UN)  92%  96%  92% 99% 93%  100% 93% 99% 92% 99% 
Access to telephone lines 2 (1-7, 
EOS)  5.9  6.6  6.2 6.7 6.2 6.8 6.2 6.7 6.0 6.8 
Access to Cellular phones (1-7, EOS)  6.5  6.7  6.5  6.8  6.5  6.8  6.5  6.8  6.4  6.8 
Access to Internet in schools (1-7, 
EOS)  4.8  5.4  4.8 5.9 5.0 5.6 4.8 5.8 4.5 5.9 
Quality of Infrastructure (1-7, EOS)  4.8  5.7  5.1  5.9  4.9  6.1  4.9  6.0  4.6  6.1 
Quality of Electricity (1-7, EOS)  5.5  6.3  5.8  6.6  5.8  6.6  5.7  6.7  5.6  6.6 
                                
Overall  Number  of  Cities  64  62  90 42 34 33 34 33 73 65 
Note: Each column variable was segmented into two equal samples, below and above the median 
value of the full sample. 
 
The significance of the results of the link between governance and city performance is also 
summarized in Table 3 below, which presents both the magnitude (numerical) and 
significance (asterisks) of the coefficient of a regression of service performance on 
governance.  As we see in the table, it does suggest the extent to which governance is 
important when utilizing the full sample, as well as when dissecting whether it matters in 
particular for local and global cities. We note that the results are large and significant for 
both local and global cities (with very rare exceptions), further supporting the chart results 
illustrated in Figures 1a through 1i and Tables 2a, 2b and 2c above.
16   
 
The results also suggest that these substantial additional benefits of improving governance 
generally do not differ significantly depending on whether the city is of a global or local 
nature (as indicated in the table by small magnitudes and lack of significance of the 
‘difference’ row for each service). The exception is the case of control of corruption and 
access to water and to telephones, which seem more important for local cities than global 
cities, and bribery in utility and quality of infrastructure and access to internet at schools, 
which is more important for global cities. These results may hint at the possibility of 
differential weights on the type of service that matters for local versus global cities. The 
results for sewerage are also quite high, and could be due to other efforts. More details on the 
technological and network aspects of services can be found in section 6.
                                                 
16 Telephone access in Tables 2a and 2b seems to show overall a higher difference than other services.  This 
may be because telecommunications, which is also a voice enhancing tool, is rather important—a more 
globalized city with better telecommunications services may offer better opportunities for voice, both local 
and international, and hence derive more transparency.  Such a result has been envisaged by some researchers 
(see Sassen 2002). 
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 TABLE 3: Governance Effect on Service Performance/Access for Global and Local Cities 
 
ACCESS TO WATER (%)
SAMPLE Bribery in Utility State Capture Control of Corruption
Full City Sample 0.11*** 0.10*** 0.11***
Global City 0.10* 0.04 0.06*
Local City 0.09** 0.10** 0.15***
Differential 0.01 -0.06 -0.09*
ACCESS TO SEWERAGE (%)
Bribery in Utility State Capture Control of Corruption
Full City Sample 0.15*** 0.13*** 0.16***
Global City 0.13 0.07 0.08*
Local City 0.13** 0.11 0.21***
Differential 0.00 -0.04 -0.13
ACCESS TO ELECTRICITY (%)
Bribery in Utility State Capture Control of Corruption
Full City Sample 0.05** 0.05** 0.05***
Global City 0.05 0.06* 0.06**
Local City 0.05* 0.07* 0.07**
Differential 0.00 -0.01 -0.01
ACCESS TO TELEPHONES [1] (%)
Bribery in Utility State Capture Control of Corruption
Full City Sample 0.19*** 0.15*** 0.24***
Global City 0.17*** 0.13** 0.14***
Local City 0.16*** 0.09 0.32***
Differential 0.01 0.04 -0.18**
QUALITY OF INFRASTRUCTURE (1-7)
Bribery in Utility State Capture Control of Corruption
Full City Sample 0.99*** 0.98*** 1.10***
Global City 0.96*** 0.86*** 0.99***
Local City 0.57*** 0.82*** 0.87***
Differential 0.39*** 0.04 0.12
QUALITY OF ELECTRICITY (1-7)
Bribery in Utility State Capture Control of Corruption
Full City Sample 1.06*** 0.92*** 1.10***
Global City 1.05*** 0.82*** 0.99***
Local City 0.80*** 0.79*** 1.10***
Differential 0.25 0.03 -0.11
ACCESS TO TELEPHONES [2] (1-7)
Bribery in Utility State Capture Control of Corruption
Full City Sample 0.87*** 0.85*** 0.82***
Global City 0.81*** 0.53*** 0.70***
Local City 0.92*** 0.78*** 1.10***
Differential -0.11 -0.25 -0.40
ACCESS TO CELL PHONES (1-7)
Bribery in Utility State Capture Control of Corruption
Full City Sample 0.43*** 0.35*** 0.44***
Global City 0.39*** 0.30*** 0.34***
Local City 0.35*** 0.21* 0.53***
Differential 0.04 0.09 -0.19
INTERNET ACCESS AT SCHOOL (1-7)
Bribery in Utility State Capture Control of Corruption
Full City Sample 0.99*** 0.93*** 1.12***
Global City 0.97*** 0.82*** 0.98***
Local City 0.64*** 0.78*** 1.21***
Differential 0.33* 0.04 -0.23
Refer also to Annex A for correlation matrix.
Note: Initial sample of 262 cities was divided into two equal samples according to whether the city is global or local.  We then ran a set of univariate pooled regressions of 
service performance/access against selected governance variables(bribery in utility, state capture and control of corruption, as per columns).  The results for the magnitude and 
significance of coefficients for global and local samples are reported in the global city and local city rows, respectively. In each econometric specification, we also included a 
dummy (for global city=1, local city=0) to identify the two samples as well as an interactive term (dummy * governance) to capture the differential impact of governance on city 
performance between global and local cities.  Last row reports the differential of the coefficients (bolded, with significance levels) along with coefficients on governance variables 
for full sample and subsets.  24
We broaden our presentation of the statistical results by summarizing the evidence obtained 
from the multi-variate econometric specifications, where a fuller set of controls in multiple 
specifications explaining service performance were included.  As per description of the 
simple model and legend with the variables presented in the previous section, we 
performed econometric tests through OLS specifications with the various service 
performance outcomes as dependent variables, and with city characteristics, city and 
country governance and globalization indicators, as well as country characteristics, as 
independent variables.   
 
Table 4 below presents the combined synthesis of the results of all econometric 
specifications. This synthesis presents the magnitude values (+,0,- on the left) and 
significance (with asterisks, on the right), which we obtain by averaging the magnitude and 
significance of the regression results of 21 different OLS specifications, for each city 
performance indicator.
17   
 
From the implementation of the fuller econometric model, for which the results are 
summarized in Table 4 above, we obtain a number of salient results.  There is an effect of 
City Globalization on performance using both the Taylor (Global City variable) and the UN 
(water, electricity, telephone, and sewerage access variables) databases.  This effect is 
relatively modest in some cases yet present, though with varying levels of significance 
depending on the type of service, controls used, and model specifications. The variable that 
is most correlated to city globalization (global city (3)) is the quality of electricity. 
  
Other city globalization proxies, such as city web portal with information on steps to start a 
firm (business dummy), and whether the budget is transparently available on the web 
(budget dummy), show positive and significant results, but these results are not robust 
across all service variables.  In particular, access to cell phones (as opposed to telephones), 
and the overall quality of infrastructure are significant, while the other service variables, 
such as access to water, electricity and sewerage, and to telephone lines show less 
significance.  See Section 6 below for a more detailed treatment of some of the city 
characteristics and related results. Bribery in utility seems to also be important, showing 
significant results for all service variables in Table 4. 
 
Definition of city as a space is sensitive to the definitions of city boundaries, whether core 
city or broader agglomeration.  We have corrected for thisby using city as an outcome for 
the analysis.  Such a construct: (a) allows us to use “city as a place” as an input to the 
analysis and hence is less sensitive to the boundary definitions; and (b) the UN database 
                                                 
17 In particular, for each independent variable, for calculating the magnitude of the coefficient rating (left 
hand side), we computed the product of the average coefficient magnitude across all specifications times 
twice the standard deviation of the variable.  Then we assigned magnitude values according to the following 
criteria: for positive coefficients, we applied a “++++” for any value above 1.2; “+++” for any value between 
0.7 and 1.2; “++” for any value between 0.4 and 0.7; “+” for any value between 0.1 and 0.4; and finally a 
“0”’for any value below 0.1.  Similarly, minus signs were applied to negative coefficients. For the rating on 
the significance of the coefficient in each cell (right hand side), we averaged the various significance levels 
across the 21 specifications, where “***” indicates significance at 1%, “**” indicates significance at 5%, “*” 
indicates significance at 10% and ‘ indicates significance at 15%.   
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has data on city size by core city and urban agglomeration, and we did not find any 
differences when either of the two measures were used.  In any case, the data has 
measurement errors as any data base, and this is why we used similar indicators from 
different sources (e.g. access to telephones in UN databases and the same indicator in EOS 
database) to check the sensitivity of the results across databases.  These results are robust 
and independent of the definition of city boundaries.  We did control for various definitions 
of city boundaries by running regressions both on core city population and metropolitan 
population, with same results. 
 




Source UN 1998 UN 1998 UN 1998 UN 1998 EOS 2003 EOS 2003 EOS 2003 EOS 2003 EOS 2003




















% % % % 1-7 1-7 1-7 1-7 1-7
City Variables
City Population 0 / 0 0 / 0 0 / 0 0 / 0 + / 0 + / 0 0 / 0 + / * + / 0
Global City (3) 0 / 0 0 / 0 0 / 0 0 / 0 + / 0 0 / 0 0 / 0 + / 0 + / **
Bribery in Utility + / ' 0 / ' + / ' + / ** ++++ / *** ++ / *** - / 0 ++++ / *** ++++ / ***
Business Dummy 0 / 0 0 / 0 0 / 0 + / * + / ' 0 / * 0 / 0 +++ / ** ++ / **
Website dummy 0 / 0 0 / ' 0 / 0 + / 0 ++ / ** + / ** 0 / 0 + / * + / '
Budget Dummy 0 / ' 0 / 0 0 / * 0 / 0 + / * 0 / 0 + / 0 + / 0 0 / 0
Port Dummy - / ** 0 / ' 0 / 0 - / ** + / 0 0 / 0 + / * 0 / ** - / *
Capital Dummy 0 / 0 0 / 0 0 / 0 0 / 0 - / 0 - / 0 + / *** - / * 0 / 0
Country Variables
Country Population 0 / 0 0 / 0 0 / 0 0 / 0 0 / 0 0 / 0 ++ / ** 0 / 0 - / *
Urbanization (%) + / ' 0 / ' 0 / 0 + / ' + / 0 + / 0 0 / * 0 / ' + / '
Kearney Globalization Index 0 / ' 0 / 0 0 / 0 + / 0 + / * + / * + / * +++ / *** +++ / ***
Control of Corruption + / ** 0 / * + / ' + / ** ++++ / *** ++ / ** + / 0 ++++ / *** ++++ / ***
Income per capita + / *** + / ** ++ / *** ++ / *** ++++ / *** +++ / *** +++ / *** ++++ / *** ++++ / ***
# of cities 63 61 59 42 194 194 194 194 194
Adjusted R-squared 0.28 0.11 0.29 0.37 0.39 0.28 0.28 0.45 0.50
Sources: All dependent variables drawn from  UN 1998 and EOS 2003;  globalization index downloaded from Foreign Policy Magazine, 2002 (Kearney);  country 
population and urbanization drawn from WDI 2002;  city population downloaded from website: www.citypopulation.de ; port, capital, budget and business dummies 
drawn from KLM 2003; Control of Corruption drawn from KK02; Global city (3) drawn from GAWC (Taylor, 2001); income per capita drawn from Herston-Summers 
and CIA World Factbook (2001); bribery in Utility drawn from EOS 2003.
Source: KLM city database, drawing from EOS-WEF 2003 as well as other sources as per below.
Sample size:  412 cities in 134 countries.  
Values for magnitude (+,0,-) and significance (*,0,') in each cell were obtained by averaging results of 21 different OLS specifications. In particular, for each 
independent variable, for calculating the magnitude of the coefficient rating (left hand side), we computed the product of the average coefficient magnitude across 
all specifications  times twice the standard deviation of the  variable.  Then we assigned magnitude values according to the following criteria: for positive 
coefficients, we applied a  “++++” for any value above 1.2; “+++” for any value between 0.7 and 1.2; “++” for any value between 0.4 and 0.7 ; “+” for any value 
between 0.1 and 0.4; and finally a “0”’for any value below 0.1.  Similarly, minus signs were applied to negative coefficients. For the rating on the significance of the 
coefficient in each cell (right hand side), we averaged the various significance levels across the 21 specifications, where ***  indicates significance at 1%,  **” 
indicates significance at 5%, * indicates significance at 10% and  ‘  indicates significance at 15%.
Values for number of cities and R-square were computed as simple averages across all specifications.  26
These econometric results are consistent with and support what was described in the 
previous figures and tables.  Further, it is important to observe differences across services 
in terms of the importance of globalization on performance.  Indeed, the results suggest that 
there are differential impacts of globalization on city performance, depending on the 
options city residents have for exit or choice.  In the services where they can exit, such as 
water and electricity, then globalization has limited impact on city performance.  In cases 
where they cannot exit, there seems to be more impact.  The role of voice and participation, 
when you cannot exit seems to be critical, and significant, as shown by the significance of 
the variables such as bribery in utility and control of corruption (see Table 4 above).   
 
Lee and Anas (1996) potently gave an illustration consistent with these results.  They 
analyzed the decisions firms made to locate or not in cities in Nigeria and Indonesia, and 
also found that where public supply of electricity was unreliable, they could substitute by 
private generation capacity that they themselves installed.  A sister paper (Kaufmann, 
Léautier, and Mastruzzi, 2004) provides a more detailed look at both the issue of 
technology and that of scale and city characteristics. 
 
Country globalization (Kearney Globalization Index) also matters for city level 
performance. It is significant for all service variables except access to electricity, sewerage 
and telephone lines. What is interesting in the results in Table 4 is that city performance for 
network infrastructure (electricity grid, sewerage, telephone lines) is impacted by two 
aspects of governance (bribery in utility at the city level, control of corruption at the 
country level) and per capita income. Rich countries can afford to provide network 
infrastructure in cities. And better control of city and country level corruption leads to 
better performance of cities in providing access to services. 
 
In summary, we find that there is an effect of city globalization on performance of cities 
using both the Taylor and the UN databases.  While the strength of the effects appears to be 




5  Determinants of City Governance   
 
5.1  A simple Framework   
 
The dramatic increase in empirical work on governance over the past few years has 
spearheaded a more in-depth analysis of the manifestations, causes, and consequences of 
misgovernance and corruption. It has drawn from cross-country data as well as in-country 
diagnostic perspectives. Significant inroads have been made in unbundling governance to 
measure and analyze its detailed components, as well as in exploring empirically the 
governance performance of different institutions—such as parliament, police, and customs.   
 
We use three indicators of governance to investigate the relationship between globalization 
and governance.  The first is an indicator of governance from the political perspective 
which we represent by an indicator of low illegal party financing.  The second is a measure   27
of public sector governance for which we use an indicator on low diversion of public funds.  
Third, we use an indicator of the effectiveness of public services where we use a measure 
of trust and performance of the postal system.  With these three indicators, we see that 
globalization is positively related to good governance (Figure 2a).  
 
For city governance we use a measure of whether a city is providing services to its citizens 
(low health access gap) and whether it has a well functioning public sector with low bribery 
in taxes or in the provision of utilities.  The data shows that, the more urbanized a country 
is, the better its level of city governance (Figure 2b). This finding is of historical 
importance as most of what we now practice in the form of country governance was first 
developed in city states such as in Greece at the time of Plato in the 4
th century B.C. or 
Jericho over 10,000 years ago. As illustrated in Figure 2c, the data suggest that neither city 
nor country size negatively affect governance at the city level.  Furthermore, there is no 
evidence that a higher degree of urbanization within a country has a detrimental impact on 
the governance of cities; in fact, for some dimensions the extent of urbanization may have a 
positive effect.  
 
We find no support for the argument that capital cities are better or worse governed which 
somewhat contrasts with the empirical importance of the extent of globalization, if we 
assume that capital cities tend to be more globalized (Figure 2c).   
 
This early exploration suggests that some commonly held beliefs on city-level performance 
can be empirically challenged—such as the notions that in larger cities performance and 
governance will suffer due to diseconomies of agglomeration; that port cities, or the 
country’s capital, will generally tend to be more corrupt than other cities; or that 
urbanization or globalization may bring about mis-governance.   
 
 
Complementing the stylized results shown in the various panels of Figure 2, we summarize 
in table 5 below the key average ratings for the governance variables we utilize, against the 
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Low Globalization Medium globalization High globalization
Low Illegal Party Financing
Low Diversion of Public Funds




Source: Executive Opinion Survey (2003). 




Low Urbanization Medium Urbanization High Urbanization
Low Health Access Gap
Low Bribery in Taxes





Source: Executive Opinion Survey (2003). 












Low Bribery to affect laws, regulations






City Population Capital City
 
Source: Executive Opinion Survey (2003).   29
Next we review whether the results we have found are robust across databases and across 
different definitions of globalization and governance.  The results are shown in Table 5 
below.  Overall, we observe higher levels of governance in global cities, although the 
magnitude of the differences between local and global cities varies depending on the type 
of governance variable used.  These results are similar irrespective of whether one 
considers the full sample of 412 cities (shown in table 5 below), or when the samples are 
segmented into non-OECD and OECD cities (not shown).   
 



















All variables range from 1 (bad) to 7 (good) with exception of cost of imports which is shown in percentage terms 
 
The synthesis results of the full set of econometric specifications is presented in table 6 
below, and the full regression results appear in Table 4 of the paper.  We find that 
globalization at both city and country level (Kearney Globalization Index) is positively 
correlated with all the measures of governance.  Globalization at a country level, as 
measured by the Kearney Globalization Index is significant and positive against all the 
governance indicators, except cost of imports where it is significant and negative.  Per 
capita income is also positively correlated with all dimensions of governance.   
 
The results shown in Table 6 are relatively robust and significant.  With some 
specifications, country level globalization seems to dominate the city globalization 
variable.  Partly this may be the fact that country level globalization in the more 
fundamental (macroeconomic and trade) sense vis-à-vis the rest of the world is even more 
important than city-specific measures or city specific attractiveness.  Yet in part this result 
may also reflect the fact that the country globalization variable was constructed specifically 
for the purpose to have a globalization indicator, while the city globalization variables we 
are utilizing are indirect (and partial) proxies.  Thus, the measurement errors may differ, 



















1-7 1-7 1-7 % 1-7 1-7 1-7
Local 4.39 3.46 3.78 23.8 3.61 3.14 3.06
Global 5.64 4.46 4.84 14.2 4.76 3.93 4.42
L o w4 . 9 53 . 7 24 . 2 71 7 . 43 . 9 93 . 3 33 . 4 4
High 5.05 4.00 4.32 18.2 4.24 3.53 3.76
L o w5 . 0 63 . 8 54 . 3 21 6 . 44 . 1 13 . 4 63 . 6 6
High 4.94 3.92 4.27 19.7 4.17 3.43 3.59
No 5.01 3.85 4.26 17.2 4.14 3.45 3.63
Y e s4 . 9 93 . 9 24 . 3 31 9 . 24 . 1 13 . 4 23 . 6 0
No 4.90 3.76 4.16 18.5 4.04 3.37 3.50
Y e s6 . 1 95 . 1 95 . 4 21 0 . 75 . 1 84 . 2 65 . 0 2
L o w4 . 6 93 . 5 84 . 0 02 0 . 63 . 9 03 . 0 33 . 1 6
High 6.21 4.88 5.46 9.6 5.11 4.36 5.04
L o w4 . 4 03 . 5 83 . 9 32 1 . 53 . 6 53 . 1 23 . 1 0
High 5.84 4.26 4.77 13.0 4.79 3.88 4.34
Website has information on 
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Two proxies for city level globalization which look at cities that have attracted business in 
finance, accounting, and advertising (global city 3) and those that have a transparent way of 
allowing firms to set up a business (business dummies) are better governed in all 
dimensions of governance. 
 






































Source EOS 2003 EOS 2003 EOS 2003 EOS 2003 EOS 2003 EOS 2003 EOS 2003
Dependent Variables
Low Bribery in 
Utilities
Low Informal Money 
Laundering
Low Street Crime
Red Tape Cost of 
Imports




Low Illegal Party 
Financing
1-7 (good) 1-7 (good) 1-7 (good) 1-9 (bad) 1-7 (good) 1-7 (good) 1-7 (good)
City Variables
City Population + / ' + / ' 0 / 0 0 / 0 + / 0 + / ' 0 / 0
Global City (3) + / ' ++ / *** + / ' - / ** ++ / ** ++ / ** ++ / ***
Country city size ratio + / ' + / ' + / ' 0 / 0 + / ' + / ' + / *
Business Dummy ++ / *** +++ / *** ++ / ** - / ' ++ / ** +++ / *** ++ / **
Website dummy + / 0 + / ' + / 0 0 / 0 + / 0 + / ' 0 / 0
Budget Dummy 0 / 0 + / 0 + / 0 0 / 0 - / 0 0 / 0 0 / 0
Port Dummy 0 / 0 + / ' + / 0 0 / 0 0 / 0 + / ' + / '
Capital Dummy 0 / 0 - / ' 0 / 0 + / 0 - / 0 - / ' - / '
Country Variables
Country Population --- / *** -- / ' - / 0 ++ / ' -- / * -- / * --- / **
Urbanization (%) ++ / ** 0 / 0 -- / ' 0 / * + / ' 0 / 0 0 / 0
Kearney Globalization Index ++++ / *** ++++ / *** ++++ / *** --- / *** +++ / *** ++++ / *** ++++ / ***
Income per capita ++++ / *** +++ / *** ++++ / *** ---- / *** ++++ / *** ++++ / *** +++ / ***
# of cities 193 193 193 193 193 193 193
Adjusted R-squared 0.30 0.21 0.19 0.24 0.21 0.29 0.17
Sources: All dependent variables drawn from  UN 1998 and EOS 2003;  globalization index downloaded from Foreign Policy Magazine, 2002 (Kearney);  country population and urbanization 
drawn from WDI 2002;  city population downloaded from website: www.citypopulation.de ; port, capital, size ratio, budget, website and business dummies drawn from KLM 2004; Global city (3) 
drawn from GAWC (Taylor); income per capita drawn from Heston-Summers and CIA World Factbook (2001).
Source: KLM city database, drawing from EOS-WEF 2003 as well as other sources as per below.  All dependent variables range from bad to good with exception of costs of imports.
Sample size:  412 cities in 134 countries.  
Values for magnitude (+,0,-) and significance (*,0,') in each cell were obtained by averaging results of 21 different OLS specifications. In particular, for each independent variable, for calculating 
the magnitude of the coefficient rating (left hand side), we computed the product of the average coefficient magnitude across all specifications  times twice the standard deviation of the  
variable.  Then we assigned magnitude values according to the following criteria: for positive coefficients, we applied a  “++++” for any value above 1.2; “+++” for any value between 0.7 and 1.2;
“++” for any value between 0.4 and 0.7 ; “+” for any value between 0.1 and 0.4; and finally a “0”’for any value below 0.1.  Similarly, minus signs were applied to negative coefficients. For the 
rating on the significance of the coefficient in each cell (right hand side), we averaged the various significance levels across the 21 specifications, where ***  indicates significance at 1%,  **” 
indicates significance at 5%, * indicates significance at 10% and  ‘  indicates significance at 15%.
Values for number of cities and R-square were computed as simple averages across all specifications.  31
We have summarized the results of the many econometric specifications to explain the 
potential determinants of city governance in the synthesis in Table 6 (the full set of 





7  Concluding: Future Research and Emerging Policy Implications  
 
7.1 Brief  synthesis  
 
In this paper we attempted to contribute to the field of urban governance and globalization 
through an empirically-based exploration of some key determinants of the performance of 
cities.  This empirical inquiry was made possible through the construction of a worldwide 
database for cities that contains variables and indicators of globalization (at the country and 
city level), of city governance, and of city performance (access and quality of infrastructure 
service delivery).  This city database integrates existing data with new data gathered 
specifically for this research project.  We find that good governance and globalization 
matter for city-level performance in terms of access and quality of delivery of infrastructure 
services, and also that globalization and good city governance are related.  There appear to 
be dynamic pressures from globalization and accountability that result in better 
performance at the city level.  Furthermore, we find that there are complex interactions 
between technology, governance and city performance, as well as evidence of a non-linear 
(u-shaped) relationship between city size and performance, challenging the view that very 
large cities necessarily exhibit lower performance and pointing to potential agglomeration 
economies.  Our framework also suggests a way of bridging two seemingly competing 
strands of the literature, namely viewing the city as a place or as an outcome.  We find 
evidence that port cities seem to be in general more dependent on good governance for the 
city performance variables that matter for globalization (access to cell phone, internet 
access) and that capital cities tend more to serve local sewerage access better (water 
sewerage, electricity).  
 
A preliminary analysis of city level data from EOS 2004 corroborates the main findings in 
our paper (summarized in Annexes A and B). These results were corroborated when 
replacing 2003 data with 2004 data.  Finally, 2004 data confirms the strong positive 
correlation between city performance and globalization as well as the strong positive 
correlation between city performance and city governance that we highlighted in Sections 4 
and 5 . This is indicative of the robustness of our results.   
 
                                                 
18 We have presented synthesis results and have not shown the results of multiple correlations.  We also have 
chosen to use data plots and not the actual econometric results.  We thought the synthesis results were a better 
way to present the results.  The actual regressions were tested for sign switches, and except for the access to 
electricity variable, the regressions did not show sign switches for the key variables.  This is why we thought 
it best to show the range of coefficient estimates and the statistical significance.  All the synthesis tables we 
have developed present controlled statistical results, as opposed to bivariate regressions, even if shown only 
in synthesis form.   32
7.2  Issues for Future Research 
 
There are a number of issues to consider for future research.  First, with our dataset and 
empirical approach we need to keep in mind both a purely statistical point, as well as one 
of a more methodological/conceptual nature.  The first refers to the limits we have after 
crossing variables from different datasets (Taylor/UN/EOS) in terms of the overlapping 
number of observations/cities (N), which for some indicators in Table 1 is very small.  
Thus, a major challenge in the next stage is to expand this database, and fill in the 
significant gaps within the existing set of over 400 cities.  We expect to be able to 
collaborate with partners in this initiative.  This expanded database would be made 
available on the web to all researchers and policy-makers (see Annex C for the current list 
of cities for which this dataset has information on at least some of the variables of interest 
in this research project).   
 
Second, we need to probe much deeper than was possible in this preliminary exploration on 
the issue of the dynamics between globalization and governance, and their interface with 
city performance.  For instance, we found that globalization and governance are positively 
correlated with each other at the city level.  Our simple conceptual and econometric model 
pointed to possible causality from globalization to good governance.  Yet it cannot be ruled 
out obviously that in reality there is bi-directional causality, within an endogenous model 
where there is a possible virtuous circle between both variables.  Within such a framework, 
an extension of the simple model presented in this paper would be warranted.
19  This 
requires further research with additional data and a more complex econometric model with 
instruments, inter alia accounting for endogeneity issues. Furthermore, in this context the 
brief references to ancient times made earlier are suggestive of the need to probe further 
with an historical perspective. 
 
Given the constraints in data availability at the city and country level, in this initial research 
inquiry we did not include some other important institutional dimensions, such as 
decentralization and local finance.  Obviously it cannot be ruled out that some of the 
significance of the governance variables for which we did have measures at the city and 
country level, such as the corruption-related ones, may be picking up in part some of the 
importance of other governance and institutional variables.  Future research would need to 
                                                 
19 In essence we could conceptualize of another hypothesis, where the ability of cities to translate global 
opportunity into local value depends on governance, and that cities compete with each other on the basis of 
governance and not on the basis of initial endowments (infrastructure, culture etc).  Cities with better 
governance remain globalized for longer periods of time (attract higher flows of capital, people, firms, 
finance, products) or attract such flows systemically over time (growth or change in volumes of these flows 
over time). This test would allow us to distinguish between those cities that are highly global and then drop in 
their rankings over time.  For such a test, we would need at least two time periods.  A possible model 
specification could include:   
ΔY = f (X1, X2, X3)+ε  where                                                                                    
ΔY = change in the vector of governance indicators, to capture improvements or deterioration in governance 
over time which is a proxy for staying power in translating global opportunity to local value; 
X1 = a dummy for an alpha city from the Taylor database;   X2 = dummy for a beta city, and 
X3 = dummy for a gamma city.  With such a specification one could investigate whether alpha and beta type 
cities have better governance compared to the gamma type cities.   
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delve more in depth into these issues of potential omitted variable biases, and expand the 
database to account for additional institutional variables at the city level.  Similarly, in 
future research it will be desirable to include proxies for economic output or productivity at 
the city level (there is a limited database for city product per capita by the UN, which 
suitably expanded and updated could be used for instance.  Simple plotgrams with these 
limited dataset does suggest that city product does improve with globalization, for instance 
(see Léautier, Mehta, and Saito, 2004).
20  
 
7.3 Policy  Implications 
 
The analysis we have done has provided empirical evidence on many observations and 
statements made in the past by experts in the field, prior to the gathering and analysis of a 
data.  From this perspective, a number of policy conclusions emerge. 
 
First, our results are suggestive on the importance of focusing on country-wide governance, 
thereby tapping into economic benefits for the country at large but also providing a 
platform for cities to benefit from such environment-wide improvements.  This suggests 
that reformist majors have an incentive to promote good governance at the national level 
(given the large externalities for the city).  Further, International Financial Institutions 
(IFIs, such as the World Bank) and donors ought to continue to monitor and assess in some 
detail, how countries are faring with respect to governance at the national level.  This 
makes sense not only from a country-wide performance standpoint, but also to point to 
ways of improving city-level performance.   
 
Second, our framework and evidence also points to the fact that improving governance at 
the city level allows cities to translate global opportunity into local value for their citizens.  
This implies that reformist city leaders do have important local policy and institutional 
levers at their disposal:  governance at the local level matters significantly for urban 
performance.   Similarly, this finding suggests that donor agencies could focus more on 
supporting improvements in city level governance.  
 
Finally, it is important to work with cities to support their globalization process and status.  
In this context, the interface between globalization, technology and governance deserves 
attention.  In practical terms, web-related transparency and information outreach 
innovations are worthy illustrations, such as placing procurement and the budget on the city 
website, as well as a one-stop information and licensing ‘e-window’ for business start-ups.  
In this context, it may also be important to have a set of incentives and strategies for cities 
to network with other cities to tap into global opportunities that will benefit a given city.
21   
                                                 
20 Other areas of investigation could include looking at the influence of diaspora networks on the governance 
of a city, as well as the influence of NGO movements for instance on human rights, environment, and 
corporate social responsibility issues within the context of the city, and its links to public governance.  
Further, expanding on the research on the interface between technology choices, governance and city 
performance also appear to be a promising line of inquiry from an empirical standpoint, which will be 
addressed in forthcoming research.  
21 This would imply that IFIs such as the World  Bank work with inter-city governance alliances and 
networks, such as the association of local governments and the city-to-city partnership, such as “Cities 
Alliance”.     34
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ANNEX A: Correlation Matrix of Selected Governance Variables and 





Utility State  Capture
Control of 
Corruption 
Access to Telephones [1]  0.69*** 0.47***  0.66*** 
Access to Sewerage  0.58*** 0.45***  0.55*** 
Access to Water  0.57*** 0.45***  0.52*** 
Access to Electricity  0.31** 0.27**  0.31*** 
Quality of Infrastructure  0.79*** 0.82***  0.83*** 
Quality of Electricity  0.85*** 0.77***  0.84*** 
Access to Telephones [2]  0.83*** 0.64***  0.74*** 
Access to Cell Phones  0.67*** 0.57***  0.64*** 
Access to Internet in school  0.82*** 0.80***  0.88*** 
AVERAGE  0.68 0.58  0.66 
      
GLOBAL CITY SAMPLE 
 
Bribery in 
Utility  State Capture
Control of 
Corruption 
Access to Telephones [1]  0.75*** 0.52**  0.69*** 
Access to Sewerage  0.57  0.38    0.52* 
Access to Water  0.58* 0.35  0.54* 
Access to Electricity  0.32 0.26*  0.37** 
Quality of Infrastructure  0.74*** 0.76***  0.79*** 
Quality of Electricity  0.87*** 0.76***  0.84*** 
Access to Telephones [2]  0.84*** 0.60***  0.73*** 
Access to Cell Phones  0.67*** 0.57***  0.59*** 
Access to Internet in school  0.81*** 0.77***  0.84*** 
AVERAGE  0.68 0.55  0.66 
      
LOCAL CITY SAMPLE 
 
Bribery in 
Utility State  Capture
Control of 
Corruption 
Access to Telephones [1]  0.58*** 0.25  0.60*** 
Access to Sewerage  0.44* 0.29  0.38*** 
Access to Water  0.41** 0.34**  0.39*** 
Access to Electricity  0.33* 0.32*  0.23** 
Quality of Infrastructure  0.67*** 0.70***  0.66*** 
Quality of Electricity  0.66*** 0.51***  0.63*** 
Access to Telephones [2]  0.71*** 0.49***  0.60*** 
Access to Cell Phones  0.43*** 0.22*  0.47*** 
Access to Internet in school  0.63*** 0.58***  0.81*** 
AVERAGE  0.54 0.41  0.53 
 
Note: This Annex complements Table 3 in the paper.  It shows pairwise correlations between selected 
governance variables and service access/performance variables for the full sample and for the two equal sub-
samples of global and local cities.  
 
ANNEX C:  DETERMINANTS OF CITY GOVERNANCE – SYNTHESIS OF ECONOMETRIC REGRESSION RESULTS


































 Low Health 
gap
1-7 (good) 1-7 (good) 1-7 (good) 1-9 (bad) 1-7 (good) 1-7 (good) 1-7 (good) 1-7 (good) 1-7 (good) 1-7 (good) 1-7 (good) 1-7 (good) 1-7 (good) 1-7 (good)
City Variables
City Population + / ' + / ' 0 / 0 0 / 0 + / 0 + / ' 0 / 0 ++ / * 0 / 0 0 / 0 0 / 0 0 / 0 0 / 0 0 / 0
Global City (3) + / ' ++ / *** + / ' - / ** ++ / ** ++ / ** ++ / *** ++ / ** ++ / ** + / ** ++ / *** + / ** ++ / ** + / '
Country city size ratio + / ' + / ' + / ' 0 / 0 + / ' + / ' + / * + / * + / ' 0 / 0 + / * + / * + / 0 0 / 0
Business Dummy ++ / *** +++ / *** ++ / ** - / ' ++ / ** +++ / *** ++ / ** ++ / *** ++ / * ++ / ** ++ / ** ++ / ** ++ / ** +++ / ***
Website dummy + / 0 + / ' + / 0 0 / 0 + / 0 + / ' 0 / 0 + / ' + / ' 0 / 0 + / ' + / * + / ' + / '
Budget Dummy 0 / 0 + / 0 + / 0 0 / 0 - / 0 0 / 0 0 / 0 0 / 0 0 / 0 + / 0 - / 0 0 / 0 + / ' + / 0
Port Dummy 0 / 0 + / ' + / 0 0 / 0 0 / 0 + / ' + / ' 0 / 0 - / ' + / 0 + / 0 + / 0 0 / 0 0 / 0
Capital Dummy 0 / 0 - / ' 0 / 0 + / 0 - / 0 - / ' - / ' - / * - / 0 - / ' - / ' 0 / 0 - / ' - / 0
Country Variables
Country Population --- / *** -- / ' - / 0 ++ / ' -- / * -- / * --- / ** --- / *** --- / ** -- / ** -- / * -- / ' - / ' --- / ***
Urbanization (%) ++ / ** 0 / 0 -- / ' 0 / * + / ' 0 / 0 0 / 0 + / * ++ / ' + / ' 0 / 0 - / 0 - / 0 - / 0
Kearney Globalization Index ++++ / *** ++++ / *** ++++ / *** --- / *** +++ / *** ++++ / *** ++++ / *** ++++ / *** ++++ / *** +++ / *** ++++ / *** ++++ / *** ++++ / *** ++++ / ***
Income per capita ++++ / *** +++ / *** ++++ / *** ---- / *** ++++ / *** ++++ / *** +++ / *** ++++ / *** ++++ / *** +++ / *** ++++ / *** +++ / *** ++++ / *** ++++ / ***
# of cities 193 193 193 193 193 193 193 193 193 193 193 193 193 193
Adjusted R-squared 0.30 0.21 0.19 0.24 0.21 0.29 0.17 0.25 0.28 0.15 0.21 0.18 0.29 0.31
Sources: All dependent variables drawn from  UN 1998 and EOS 2003;  globalization index downloaded from Foreign Policy Magazine, 2002 (Kearney);  country population and urbanization drawn from WDI 2002;  city population downloaded 
from website: www.citypopulation.de ; port, capital, size ratio, budget, website and business dummies drawn from KLM 2004; Global city (3) drawn from GAWC (Taylor); income per capita drawn from Heston-Summers and CIA World Factbook 
(2001).
Source: KLM city database, drawing from EOS-WEF 2003 as well as other sources as per below.  All dependent variables range from bad to good with exception of costs of imports.
Sample size:  412 cities in 134 countries.  
Values for magnitude (+,0,-) and significance (*,0,') in each cell were obtained by averaging results of 21 different OLS specifications. In particular, for each independent variable, for calculating the magnitude of the coefficient rating (left hand 
side), we computed the product of the average coefficient magnitude across all specifications  times twice the standard deviation of the  variable.  Then we assigned magnitude values according to the following criteria: for positive coefficients, we 
applied a  “++++” for any value above 1.2; “+++” for any value between 0.7 and 1.2; “++” for any value between 0.4 and 0.7 ; “+” for any value between 0.1 and 0.4; and finally a “0”’for any value below 0.1.  Similarly, minus signs were applied to 
negative coefficients. For the rating on the significance of the coefficient in each cell (right hand side), we averaged the various significance levels across the 21 specifications, where ***  indicates significance at 1%,  **” indicates significance at 
5%, * indicates significance at 10% and  ‘  indicates significance at 15%.
Values for number of cities and R-square were computed as simple averages across all specifications.














































CITIES COUNTRY CITIES COUNTRY CITIES COUNTRY
Kabul Afghanistan Xiamen China Munich Germany
Tirana Albania BARRANQUILLA Colombia Stuttgart Germany
Algiers Algeria Bogota Colombia Accra Ghana
CONSTANTINE Algeria Manizales Colombia TEMA Ghana
ORAN Algeria MEDELLIN Colombia Athens Greece
REGHATA Algeria PEREIRA Colombia Guatemala City Guatemala
Luanda Angola Kinshasa Congo, dem. Rep. Conakry Guinea
Buenos Aires Argentina ALAJUELA Costa Rica Georgetown Guyana
SAN FERNANDO Argentina CARTAGO Costa Rica PORT-AU-PRINCE Haiti
Yerevan Armenia HEREDIA Costa Rica LA CEIBA Honduras
Adelaide Australia CAKOVEC Croatia SAN PEDRO SULA Honduras
Brisbane Australia KARLOVAC Croatia TEGUCIGALPA Honduras
Canberra Australia OSIJEK Croatia VILLANUEVA Honduras
Hobart Australia PULA Croatia Hong Kong Hong Kong
Melbourne Australia RIJEKA Croatia Budapest Hungary
Perth Australia SPLIT Croatia GYONGYOS Hungary
Sydney Australia VARAZDIN Croatia KAPOSVAR Hungary
Wellington Australia ZADAR Croatia TATABANTA Hungary
Linz Austria Zagreb Croatia REYKJAVIK Iceland
Vienna Austria Havana Cuba Ahmadabad India
Baku Azerbaijan Limassol Cyprus Bangalore India
Manama Bahrain Nicosia Cyprus Calcutta India
Dhaka Bangladesh Prague Czech Republic Chennai India
Minsk Belarus Aarhus Denmark DELHI India
Antwerp Belgium Copenhagen Denmark Hyderabad India
Brussels Belgium Santo Domingo Dominican Republic Jaipur India
WATERLOO Belgium CUENCA Ecuador Lucknow India
La Paz Bolivia Guayaquil Ecuador Mumbai India
SANTA CRUZ Bolivia IBARRA Ecuador New Delhi India
GABORONE Botswana Quito Ecuador PUNE India
Belo Horizonte Brazil 10TH OF RAMADAN Egypt Bandung Indonesia
Brazilia Brazil 6TH OF OCTOBER Egypt Batam Indonesia
Curitiba Brazil Cairo Egypt Jakarta Indonesia
Porto Alegre Brazil GIZA Egypt Medan Indonesia
Recife Brazil ANTIGUO CUSCATLAN El Salvador Tehran Iran
Rio de Janeiro Brazil San Salvador El Salvador Baghdad Iraq
Salvadore Brazil TALLINN Estonia CORK Ireland
Sao Paulo Brazil TARTU Estonia Dublin Ireland
Sofia Bulgaria Addis Ababa Ethiopia Jerusalem Israel
VARNA Bulgaria ESPOO Finland Tel Aviv Israel
Douala Cameroon Helsinki Finland BELLUNO Italy
Yaounde Cameroon Lille France Bologna Italy
Calgary Canada Lyon France Genoa Italy
Edmonton Canada Marseilles France Milan Italy
Montreal Canada Paris France Naples Italy
Ottawa Canada Strasbourg France PORDENONE Italy
Quebec Canada BACAU Gambia Rome Italy
Toronto Canada BANJU Gambia Turin Italy
Vancouver Canada KANIFING Gambia Abidjan Ivory Coast
Winnipeg Canada SEREKUNDA Gambia Kingston Jamaica
N'DJAMENA Chad Berlin Germany Kyoto Japan
Santiago Chile Bonn Germany Nagoya Japan
TALCAHUANO Chile Dortmund Germany Osaka Japan
Beijing China Dresden Germany Tokyo Japan
Dalian China Dusseldorf Germany Yokohama Japan
Guangzhou China Essen Germany Amman Jordan
Nanjing China Frankfurt Germany Almaty kazakhstan
Shanghai China Hamburg Germany Mombasa Kenya
Shenzhen China KOELN Germany Nairobi Kenya
Tianjin China Leipzig Germany Pyongyang Korea, north  39














































CITIES COUNTRY CITIES COUNTRY CITIES COUNTRY
Pusan Korea, South Casablanca Morocco PREVIDZA Slovak Republic
Seoul Korea, South Rabat Morocco CELJE Slovenia
Kuwait Kuwait MAPUTO Mozambique KRANJ Slovenia
AIZKRAUKLES Latvia MATOLA Mozambique Ljubljana Slovenia
DAUGAVPILS Latvia Yangon Myanmar MARIBOR Slovenia
KULDIGA Latvia Windhoek Namibia MURSKA SOBOTA Slovenia
LIEPAJA Latvia Amsterdam Netherlands NOVO MESTO Slovenia
OGRE Latvia ARNHEM Netherlands SLOVENJ GRADEC Slovenia
RIGA Latvia Rotterdam Netherlands Cape Town South Africa
VENTSPILS Latvia The Hague Netherlands Durban South Africa
Beirut Lebanon Utrecht Netherlands Johannesburg South Africa
Monrovia Liberia Auckland New Zealand MIDRAND South Africa
Tripoli libya Christchurch New Zealand Pretoria South Africa
ALYTUS Lithuania Managua Nicaragua Barcelona Spain
KAUNAS Lithuania IKEJA Nigeria Bilbao Spain
KLAIPEDA Lithuania Lagos Nigeria Madrid Spain
MARIJAMPOLE Lithuania Bergen Norway Seville Spain
PANEVEZYS Lithuania Oslo Norway Valencia Spain
SIAULIAI Lithuania STAVANGER Norway Colombo Sri Lanka
SILUTE Lithuania Ruwi Oman MOUNT LAVINIA Sri Lanka
UKMERGE Lithuania Islamabad Pakistan Khartoum Sudan
VILNIUS Lithuania Karachi Pakistan Gothenburg Sweden
Luxembourg Luxembourg Lahore Pakistan Stockholm Sweden
STRASSEN Luxembourg Rawalpindi Pakistan Basel Switzerland
Macau Macao Panama City Panama Geneva Switzerland
BITOLA Macedonia Asuncion Paraguay ST-GALLEN Switzerland
KUMAHOVO Macedonia CIUDAD DEL ESTE Paraguay Zurich Switzerland
OHRID Macedonia FDO.DE LA MORA Paraguay Damascus Syria
PRILEP Macedonia SANTA RITA Paraguay KAOHSIUNG Taiwan
SKOPJE Macedonia CALLAO Peru TAICHUNG Taiwan
STIP Macedonia Lima Peru Taipei Taiwan
STRUMICA Macedonia HO-PASIG Philippines ARUSHA Tanzania
VELES Macedonia MAKATI Philippines DAR-ES-SALAAM Tanzania
ANTANANARIVO Madagascar Manila Philippines MOROGORO Tanzania
TOAMASINA Madagascar PARANAQUE Philippines Bangkok Thailand
BLANTYRE Malawi Warsaw Poland Lome Togo
LILONGWE Malawi Lisbon Portugal ARIMA Trinidad and Tobago
Kuala Lumpur Malaysia Doha Qatar COUVA Trinidad and Tobago
Labuan Malaysia ALBA IULIA Romania Port of Spain Trinidad and Tobago
Malacca Malaysia Bucharest Romania SFAX Tunisia
Penang Malaysia CONSTANTA Romania SOUSSE Tunisia
PETALING JAYA Malaysia CRAIOVA Romania Tunis Tunisia
SHAH ALAM Malaysia IASI Romania Ankara Turkey
BAMAKO Mali ORADEA Romania BALIKESIR Turkey
SEGOU Mali PIATRA NEAMT Romania Istanbul Turkey
FLORIANA Malta PLOIESTI Romania Kampala Uganda
GZIRA Malta RAMNICO VALCEA Romania Kueb Ukraine
MARSA Malta SLATINA Romania Abu Dhabi United Arab Emirates
SAN GWANN Malta TARGOVISTE Romania Dubai United Arab Emirates
SLIEMA Malta CAMAPA Russia Birmingham United Kingdom
VALLETTA Malta Moscow Russia Bristol United Kingdom
ZEJTUN Malta St Petersburg Russia Cardiff United Kingdom
PORT LOUIS Mauritius Jeddah Saudi Arabia Edinburgh United Kingdom
GUADALAJARA Mexico Riyadh Saudi Arabia Glasgow United Kingdom
Mexico City Mexico Dakar Senegal Leeds United Kingdom
Monterrey Mexico Dar es Salaam Senegal Liverpool United Kingdom
SAN PEDRO GARZA GCIA Mexico Freetown Sierra Leone London United Kingdom
Tijuana Mexico Singapore Singapore Manchester United Kingdom
TORREON Mexico Bratislava Slovak Republic Newcastle United Kingdom
XALAPA Mexico PRESOV Slovak Republic Nottingham United Kingdom  40





























Kansas City United States
Los Angeles United States
Miami United States
Minneapolis United States
New Orleans United States






San Diego United States
San Francisco United States
San Jose United States
Seattle United States








HO CHI MINH Vietnam
Sana'a Yemen
BABEBO Yugoslavia
Belgrade Yugoslavia
KRALJEVO Yugoslavia
NIS Yugoslavia
NOVI SAD Yugoslavia
SR.MITROVICA Yugoslavia
SUBOTICA Yugoslavia
UZICE Yugoslavia
KITWE Zambia
Lusaka Zambia
NDOLA Zambia
Bulawayo Zimbabwe
Harare Zimbabwe